Tag Archives: nuclear nonproliferation

The Nuclear Proliferation Potential of Laser Enrichment

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The following is being released by Physicians for Social Responsibility:  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is putting U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy at risk if it decides not to require a formal nuclear proliferation assessment as part of the licensing process for a uranium laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, N.C.  That’s the message from 19 nuclear non-proliferation experts in a letter sent today asking the NRC to fulfill its statutory responsibility to assess proliferation threats related to the technologies it regulates. The letter is available online at http://www.psr.org/nrcassessment.

Global Laser Enrichment, LLC, a joint venture of General Electric (USA), Hitachi (Japan) and Cameco (Canada), has applied for a license to operate a laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, based on Australian SILEX technology. The NRC licensing review schedule sets September 30, 2012 as the date of license issuance.  One of the authors of the letter, Catherine Thomasson, MD, executive director, Physicians for Social Responsibility, said:“It is a widely shared view that laser enrichment could be an undetectable stepping-stone to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. To strengthen U.S. policy and protect the U.S. and the world from nuclear proliferation, the NRC should systematically and thoroughly assess the proliferation risks of any new uranium enrichment technology BEFORE issuing a license allowing their development.”  Dr. Ira Helfand, co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, said: “If the U.S. is going to have moral authority in dealing with proliferation threats in other nations, such as Iran, it must do a better job of taking responsible steps in relation to proliferation threats in our own backyard. In fact, a persuasive case can be made that laser enrichment technology requires even more immediate action, since this is a known danger that can be addressed directly by the NRC under its existing regulatory authority.”

In the letter, the experts note that the NRC has no rules or requirements for a nuclear proliferation assessment as part of this licensing process. The experts are concerned that the Commission is falling short in its duties since a 2008 NRC manual on enrichment technology clearly states that laser enrichment presents “extra proliferation concerns due to the small size and high separation factors.”

Previous letters to the NRC asking for a proliferation assessment, signed by many of today’s signatories, have been rebuffed. NRC is on record stating that the National Environmental Policy Act does not require preparation of a proliferation assessment. However, a March 27, 2012 memorandum from the Congressional Research Service clearly concludes that the NRC has legal authority “to promulgate a regulation” requiring a proliferation assessment as part of the licensing process.  Both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Atomic Energy Act are cited by the experts as statutory basis of the NRC’s responsibility to assess proliferation risks.

Excerpt, 19 Experts: Nuclear Proliferation Risks Of Laser Enrichment Require Fuller NRC Review, PRNewswire, Sept 5, 201

Proliferation Risks of Laser Enrichment

Laser Uranium Enrichment

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United Arab Emirates Push Ahead with Nuclear Energy Plans

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The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) announced today the results of the nuclear fuel procurement competition launched in July 2011. The goal of the fuel competition is to create a strategy to cover supply for the first 15 years of operations.  A portfolio of leading international nuclear fuel suppliers have been contracted to provide a series of nuclear fuel services to cover ENEC’s requirements. The resulting fuel strategy guarantees security of supply, quality assurance of fuel-related materials and competitive commercial terms to protect the interests of the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program by providing volume flexibilities and the ability to adapt to changing market conditions.

The following services have been contracted by ENEC:

• Purchase of natural uranium concentrates

• Conversion services (in which uranium concentrates are converted to material ready for enrichment)

• Enrichment services (in which the converted material is enriched to a level that is used in the fuel for nuclear energy plants)

• Purchase of enriched uranium product

The enriched uranium will be supplied to KEPCO Nuclear Fuels (KNF), which will manufacture the fuel assemblies for use in the four planned UAE units. KNF is a member of ENEC’s Prime Contract consortium, led by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).

Starting in 2014 - 2015, a total of six leading companies in the nuclear fuel supply industry will participate in the ENEC fuel supply program. ConverDyn (U.S.) will provide conversion services; Uranium One, Inc. (Canada) will provide natural uranium, URENCO (headquartered in the U.K) will provide enrichment services; and Rio Tinto (headquartered in the U.K) will provide natural uranium. TENEX (Russia) will supply uranium concentrates, conversion services and enrichment services. AREVA (France) will provide uranium concentrates, conversion services and enrichment services.

The six contracts are valued at approximately US$3 billion according to ENEC forecasts. The contracted fuel will enable the Barakah plant to generate up to 450 million MWh for a period of 15 years starting in 2017, when the first nuclear energy unit is scheduled to begin providing safe, clean, reliable and efficient electricity to the UAE.

“The completion of the fuel supply strategy is a key achievement to ENEC’s program and a clear example of how the UAE continues to set the gold standard for implementing a peaceful nuclear energy program,” said ENEC’s Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Al Hammadi. “These contracts will provide ENEC with long-term security of supply, high quality fuel and favorable pricing and commercial terms. We are also pleased that this marks the start of long-term commercial relationships with companies that have earned excellent reputations in the industry.”

The ENEC fuel procurement strategy is guided by the Government of the United Arab Emirates’ support for international non-proliferation efforts. That support was detailed in a nuclear energy policy document released by the government in April 2008 that outlined a series of commitments, including the decision to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel. That commitment was ratified by UAE Federal Law in 2009.

The procurement competition was the result of an extensive year-long process that included initial discussions between ENEC and international nuclear fuel suppliers. It was conducted in line with the industry’s best practices, under which companies contract for the various aspects of the fuel cycle as a means to ensure security of supply, high quality fuel and commercial advantage. In addition, this process will enable ENEC to build a strategic commercial capability in nuclear fuel procurement. The comprehensive analysis performed by ENEC included a peer review system to ensure that the procurement process was performed according to global standards.

ENEC expects to return to the market at various times to take advantage of favorable market conditions and to strengthen its security of supply position.  ENEC is planning to build four 1,400-MW nuclear energy units at the recently approved site, Barakah, in the Western Region of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, in order to provide the electricity needed to fuel the economic growth of the UAE. In July, ENEC received regulatory approval from both the Environment Agency of Abu Dhabi and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation for the construction of the first two nuclear energy units in Barakah.  Pending further regulatory approvals, the first unit is scheduled to begin delivering electricity to the grid in 2017. The remaining three units are scheduled to come on line in 2018, 2019 and 2020.

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Awards Nuclear Fuel Supply Contracts, Nuclear Street News, Aug 15 2012

See also UAE goes Forward with its Nuclear Energy Program

The Quiet Nuclearization of the Middle East, UAE

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The UAE Goes Forward with its Nuclear Energy Program

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EnergySolutions has been awarded a four year contract to design and supply waste management systems for the United Arab Emirates’(UAE) nuclear energy program. The program will see a Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO)-led consortium build four reactors for the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), with the reactors based on the Shin-Kori APR1400 plants, which will serve as the ‘reference plants’ for the UAE’s new build plans.  Under the contract EnergySolutions will supply liquid waste processing equipment, including ion exchange and reverse osmosis systems, which will serve to significantly reduce levels of contamination and waste.

“This contract award follows EnergySolutions’ capture of two similar deals in China and sees the Middle East join the USA and Canada, Europe, and Asia as markets for the company’s sector-leading technologies and expertise in nuclear waste processing solutions”, said Mark Morant, President, Global Commercial Group, EnergySolutions. “We are leading the way in both the clean-up of old reactors and the design of innovative waste systems for new units and we look forward to working with KEPCO & ENEC to make a success of the UAE’s exciting new build program.”

EnergySolutions has over 15 years’ experience designing and delivering liquid waste management systems to Korean customers and other Korean reactor sites where our equipment is operating include Shin-Wolsong 1-2, Shin-Kori 1-2, 3-4, Kori 1-2, 3-4, Youngwang 1-2, 3-4, and Ulchin 1-2, 3-4. The Chinese wins were at the Yangjiang and Haiyang reactor sites.

EnergySolutions Wins Major New Build Contract in the United Arab Emirates, Press Release of Energy Solutions, Feb. 23, 2012

See also Nuclear Race in the Middle East

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Nuclear Medicine and NonProliferation

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The National Nuclear Security Administration has signed a cooperative agreement with a medical material supplier to develop technology that can produce molybdenum-99 (Mo-99), an important, but potentially-dangerous material used in medical procedures.The NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative signed the agreement with NorthStar Medical Radioisotopes, LLC, to further the development of accelerator-based technology to produce molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) in the U.S.

The cooperative agreement between NNSA and NorthStar, which totals $4.6 million and is funded under a 50 percent/50 percent cost-share arrangement, will accelerate the development of the NorthStar technology to produce Mo-99 without proliferation-sensitive highly enriched uranium (HEU), said the agency. The agreement would also support the goal of ensuring a reliable domestic supply of this critical medical isotope for U.S. patients, it said. Supplies of the less dangerous, HEU-deficient, Mo-99 had been coming from companies in South Africa and Australia since last summer.

NNSA said it has partnered with four domestic commercial entities to accelerate the establishment of a diverse, reliable supply of Mo-99 within the United States that is not produced with HEU. NNSA also works with international producers to assist in the conversion of their Mo-99 production facilities from the use of HEU targets to LEU targets, as part of its Global Threat Reduction Initiative’s mission to minimize and eliminate the use of HEU in civilian applications worldwide, including in research reactors and medical isotope production facilities.

The United States currently does not have a domestic production capability for Mo-99 and must import 100 percent of its supply from foreign producers, most of which use HEU in their production processes, said NNSA. Over the past few years, technical difficulties and shutdowns at the major Mo-99 production facilities have caused severe supply shortages, which have greatly impacted the availability of Mo-99 to the medical community, it said. The Mo-99 produced by NorthStar would provide additional reliability for the U.S. supply.

Mark Rockwell. NNSA to co-produce medical radioisotope with another U.S. company, Government Security News, Nov. 2, 2011

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Iranian Nuclear Program: turning the screws on

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The U.N. atomic agency plans to reveal intelligence next week suggesting Iran made computer models of a nuclear warhead and other previously undisclosed details on alleged secret work by Tehran on nuclear arms, diplomats told The Associated Press.  Other new confidential information the International Atomic Energy Agency plans to share with its 35 board members will include satellite imagery of what the IAEA believes is a large steel container used for nuclear arms-related high explosives tests, the diplomats said.

The agency has previously listed activities it says indicate possible secret nuclear weapons work by Iran, which has been under IAEA perusal for nearly a decade over suspicions that it might be interested in develop such arms.  But the newest compilation of suspected weapons-related work is significant in substance and scope. The diplomats say they will reveal suspicions that have not been previously made public and greatly expand on alleged weapons-related experiments that have been published in previous reports on Iran's nuclear activities.  It also comes as the drumbeat of reports about possible military action against Iran's nuclear facilities intensifies.

Israeli President Shimon Peres said Friday that international community is closer to pursuing a military solution to the standoff over Iran's nuclear program than a diplomatic one. The comments, from a known dove, assumed added significance because they followed unsubstantiated reports that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was seeking his government's support for a strike against Tehran.  British media have separately cited unnamed British officials as saying London was prepared to offer military support to any U.S. strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.  In Vienna, the diplomats — from IAEA member nations — asked for anonymity because their information was privileged. One of th said the material drawn up by IAEA chief Yukiya Amano will be in an annex running around 12 pages and attached to the latest of a regular series of agency reports on Iran's nuclear enrichment program and other activities that could be used to arm nuclear missiles.  Previously undisclosed information contained in the annex, said the diplomats, will include:

— Intelligence from unnamed member states that a bus-sized steel container, located at the Iranian military base of Parchin is likely being used for nuclear-related high explosives testing of the kind needed to release an atomic blast. The agency has satellite imagery of the container.

— Expanded evidence that Iranian engineers worked on computer models of nuclear payloads for missiles.

Significantly, said the diplomats, these alleged experiments took place after 2003 — the year that Iran was believed to have stopped secret work on nuclear weapons, according to a 2007 U.S. intelligence assessment. But diplomats have told the AP that Tehran continued arms-related experiments in a less concentrated way after that date, a view reflected by recent IAEA reports that have detailed suspicions that such work may be continuing up to the present.

The annex will also say that more than 10 nations have supplied intelligence suggesting Iran is secretly developing components of a nuclear arms program — among them an implosion-type warhead that it wants to mount on a ballistic missile.

It says that two foreign "sources" — apparently countries or nongovernment groups within countries — have helped Iran develop a weapons design, without naming them. And it details how Iran bought "dual use" — peaceful or military — nuclear technology from the black market network of renegade Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan, as well as alleged preparations for a nuclear weapons test.

The upcoming report is meant to ratchet up pressure on the Islamic republic to stop four years of stonewalling of IAEA experts seeking to follow up intelligence of such secret weapons-related experiments.  Iran denies such activities, asserting that they are based on intelligence fabricated by Washington. It also denies that its uanium enrichment program — under U.N. Security Council sanctions because it could manufacture fissile warhead material — is meant for anything else but making nuclear fuel.

In his previous report in September, Amano said he was "increasingly concerned" about a stream of intelligence suggesting that Iran continues to work secretly on developing a nuclear payload for a missile and other components of a nuclear weapons program.  He said "many member states" are providing evidence for that assessment, describing the information the agency is receiving as credible, "extensive and comprehensive."  That report warned of the "possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed nuclear related activities" linked to weapons work. In particular, said the report, the agency continues to receive new information about "activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile."  Acquired from "many" member states, the information possessed by the IAEA is "extensive and comprehensive ... (and) broadly consistent and credible," said the report.

U.N. has new Iranian nuke arms claims, Associated Press, Nov. 4, 2011

See also the Security of Nuclear Materials

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Nuclear Power Alive with Assured Fuel Supply

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As part of the Obama Administration’s commitment to strengthen global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) today announced the availability of a reserve stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use as commercial nuclear power fuel. The stockpile was derived from down-blending surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the U.S. stockpile.

This new American Assured Fuel Supply (AFS) creates a vehicle for promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy without exacerbating nuclear proliferation risks. Through this plan, the U.S. is able to encourage wider use of nuclear power production at the same time as it meets U.S. nuclear disarmament obligations.

The AFS sets aside LEU down-blended from surplus U.S. weapons HEU to serve as a backup fuel supply for foreign or domestic reactors in the event of a supply disruption. Along with the International Fuel Bank to be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the AFS gives nation states that are looking to nuclear power as a clean energy source an assured supply of LEU, decreasing the need to develop costly enrichment technology. Establishing this reserve will put confidence in the U.S. as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and should encourage other governments to see American nuclear vendors as preferable partners.

“As more countries look to nuclear power as a low-carbon option for addressing growing energy demands, assuring a fuel supply without promoting proliferation sensitive technologies is a critical national security priority,” said Secretary of Energy Steven Chu. “In addition to protecting fuel supplies for commercial power producers, the Assured Fuel Supply helps demonstrate our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation by eliminating surplus weapons uranium in a way that promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”

In 2005, the Department of Energy announced that the U.S. would set aside 17.4 metric tons of surplus HEU to be blended-down to LEU and held in reserve to deal with disruptions in the nuclear fuel supply. The down-blending of the 17.4 metric tons of surplus HEU is scheduled for completion in 2012. When complete, it will result in approximately 290 metric tons of LEU, of which approximately 230 metric tons will form the reserve. The remainder of the LEU is being used to pay for the down-blending and processing costs. This will leave the AFS with approximately six reloads for an average 1,000 MW reactor.

The AFS reserve is modest in size and designed not to disrupt or replace market mechanisms. Rather, it is to be sold at market value in the event of demonstrated need after all other market options are exhausted.  DOE published an announcement of the availability of the AFS today in the Federal Register. The AFS will be available through U.S. persons to both domestic and foreign recipients. The Secretary of Energy will approve any AFS sale and have the authority to prioritize requests.

The NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security will chair an AFS Committee that will be responsible for assessing eligibility of applicants and making a recommendation to the Secretary on the sale of LEU from the AFS. This Committee will include representatives from several different DOE offices, including DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy, DOE’s Office of Environmental Management, and the DOE and NNSA Offices of General Counsel.

Established by Congress in 2000, NNSA is a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy responsible for enhancing national security through the military application of nuclear science in the nation’s national security enterprise. NNSA maintains and enhances the safety, security, reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing; reduces the global danger from weapons of mass destruction; provides the U.S. Navy with safe and effective nuclear propulsion; and responds to nuclear and radiological emergencies in the U.S. and abroad.

DOE, NNSA Announce Availability of Reserve Stockpile of Nuclear Power Reactor Fuel Material from Down-blending of Surplus Weapons-Usable Uranium, Press Release, Aug 18, 2011

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Gloves off? Nuclear Race in the Middle East

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The United States plans talks with Saudi Arabia on civilian nuclear cooperation, people familiar with the plans said, in a step that has already set off fierce criticism on Capitol Hill.   With the United States hoping to head off an arms race in response to Iran's nuclear program, officials from President Barack Obama's administration plan to head to Riyadh in the coming week for nuclear talks, the sources said.  A congressional aide, who requested anonymity as the trip has not been publicly announced, said the visit would be a "preliminary" step to "discuss the possibility of moving forward on a nuclear cooperation agreement."  A senior lawmaker from the rival Republican Party strongly criticized the visit, pointing to concerns about Saudi financing for Islamic extremists.  "I am astonished that the administration is even considering a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia," said Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.  "Saudi Arabia is an unstable country in an unstable region, with senior officials openly proclaiming that the country may pursue a nuclear weapons capability," she said in a statement Friday.  "Its ties to terrorists and terror financing alone should rule it out as a candidate for US nuclear cooperation," she said.

Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the United States in 2008 during a visit by then president George W. Bush that would give the kingdom access to enriched uranium -- meaning, unlike Iran, it would not need to master the nuclear fuel cycle.  But the agreement was only tentative, with little known effort since then to put it into practice.

Saudi Arabia is the world's largest oil exporter, with one-fifth of the world's proven reserves. The kingdom says it wants nuclear power so it does not have to burn lucrative fossil fuels at its power plants. (Nuclearl renaissance) (China-Saudi-Arabia Deal)

But the United States has been worried that Saudi Arabia and other Arab states could develop nuclear weapons if arch-enemy Iran develops an atom bomb. Iran refuses to halt uranium enrichment that it says is for civilian purposes, but which Western nations suspect is meant to develop nuclear weapons.  In 2009, the United States signed a nuclear cooperation deal with the United Arab Emirates, which renounced plans to enrich or reprocess uranium and said it would instead obtain material from international suppliers.

US, Saudi Arabia to discuss nuclear cooperation, Agence France Presse, July 30, 2011

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Nuclear Deals: India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group

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Confident in the large market it offers to the world’s nuclear suppliers, India has decided to shrug off new restrictions by a 46-nation cartel on the transfer of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies that potentially have military applications.

India, which has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that it is discriminatory, pulled off a diplomatic coup in 2008 by securing a special waiver from the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  Following a plenary in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, the NSG announced on Jun. 24 that it would "strengthen its guidelines on the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies," diluting the clean waiver granted to India and exempting it from full-scope international safeguards.  Nuclear energy experts in India told IPS that the NSG’s move may be prompted by commercial concerns and an attempt to squeeze India into buying nuclear equipment in a market rapidly narrowing down in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.

"Given the present climate for nuclear energy, countries like France, Russia and the United States, which have already signed major nuclear commerce deals with India, are unlikely to back off"....India has ambitious plans to raise its nuclear power generation from the current 4.7 gigawatts to over 20 Gw by 2020. Besides Areva, Russia’s Rosatom and General Electric from the U.S. are among corporations negotiating for deals worth more than 100 billion dollars.

In an apparent warning to the NSG, India’s foreign secretary Nirupama Rao told television interviewers on Sunday that there are "leverages" that could be applies to countries unwilling to enter into nuclear commerce with India.  Rao said the U.S., Russia and France had, since the NSG announced its new policy, made known that they would stand by their commitments to India.  French ambassador to India Jerome Bonnafont confirmed in a Jul. 1 press statement that "this NSG decision in no way undermines the parameters of our bilateral cooperation," and that France remained "committed to the full implementation of our cooperation agreement on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy signed on Sep. 30, 2008."Coming after the decision of exemption from the full-scope safeguards clause, adopted in favour of India in September 2008, it (NSG decision) does not undermine the principles of this exemption," the statement said.

Excerpt, Ranjit Devraj, INDIA: Unfazed by Nuclear Suppliers’ New Rules, Inter Press Service, July 6, 2011

 

 

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When Sanctions Start to Bite: Iran, North Korea, Syria Nuclear Nonproliferation

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On May 23, 2011, pursuant to the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), the United States imposed sanctions on two Belarusian entities, three Chinese entities and one individual, five Iranian entities and one individual, one North Korean entity, two Syrian entities and one Venezuelan entity.

The sanctioned entities are:

Belarusian entities – Belarusian Optical Mechanical Association and BelTechExport;

Chinese entities and individuals – Mr. Karl Lee, Dalian Sunny Industries, Dalian Zhongbang Chemical Industries Company, and Xian Junyun Electronic

Iranian entities and individuals – Milad Jafari, Defense Industries Organization, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, SAD Import-Export Company, and Shahid Bakeri Industries Group (SBIG)

North Korean entity – Tangun Trading

Syrian entities – Industrial Establishment of Defense and Scientific Studies and Research Center (SSRC)

Venezuelan entity – Venezuela Military Industries Company (CAVIM)

Sanctions were imposed on these entities as provided in the INKSNA because there was credible information indicating that they had transferred to or acquired from Iran, North Korea, or Syria equipment and technology listed on multilateral export control lists (Australia Group, Chemical Weapons Convention, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Wassenaar Arrangement) or otherwise having the potential to make a material contribution to WMD or cruise or ballistic missile systems.

The sanctions apply to the specific entities above and will be in effect for two years. The sanctions do not apply to these entities’ respective countries or governments.

The sanctions consist of the following:

No department or agency of the U.S. Government may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement of, any goods, services or technology from these entities;

No department or agency of the U.S. Government may provide any assistance to these entities and they shall not be eligible to participate in any assistance program of the U.S. Government;

U.S. Government sales of any item on the U.S. munitions list (USML) to any of these entities are prohibited, and sales of any defense articles, defense services or design and construction services controlled under the Arms Export Control Act are terminated; and

New licenses will be denied and any existing licenses suspended, for transfer to these entities of items controlled under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or Export Administration Regulations.

Iran, North Korea and Syria nonproliferation Act (INKSNA), Fact Sheet, United States Department of State Press Release, May 24, 2011

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Hide-and-Seek: Syria, the IAEA and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

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International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Yukiya Amano warned his agency could issue a judgment of Syria's alleged nuclear work based on current evidence if Damascus does increase its cooperation with U.N. inspecions.

The warning, confirmed by three Western diplomats with knowledge of Amano's letter to Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mouallem, marked a shift in strategy in the U.N. nuclear watchdog's bid over more than two years to examine the suspected reactor site and three other areas with possible atomic ties, the Wall Street Journal reported.

Syria has denied multiple IAEA requests for visits to the Dair Alzour site, where a suspected partially constructed nuclear reactor was destroyed by an Israeli airstrike. Inspectors were prohibited from the area after a June 2008 visit turned up traces of anthropogenic natural uranium. Damascus has rejected accusations it had engaged in illicit nuclear activities, though it suspended its cooperation with the U.N. watchdog following the 2008 visit.

The Vienna-based agency could release an assessment of Syria's nonproliferation treaty compliance as soon as this month, when it is expected to make public a new safeguards report before its 35-nation governing board convenes on March 7. Amano asked Syria's foreign minister for an answer ahead of the March meeting and said the agency would not accept an 11th-hour reply; to date, Syria's only reaction has been to request that the deadline be postponed, the three diplomats said.

The U.N. nuclear watchdog has concluded from existing evidence that Syria covertly established a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and did not disclose the facility's existence, according to two diplomats with knowledge of the investigation. The assertion is based largely on architectural similarities between the building that once stood at the site and other facilities known to house nuclear reactors, the first three diplomats said, referring to past safeguards reports by the agency. The Dair Alzour building's shielding, power and water systems were indicative of a possible nuclear reactor site, the agency indicated in reports between November 2008 and November 2010.

The United States has urged several other governing board member nations to support a potential resolution pressing Syria to permit IAEA monitors, said two of the diplomats, each of whom represent member nations. Such a call can precede further U.N. action, according to the Journal.

Unofficial calls for a governing board resolution were issued when the board last convened in December, one of the three diplomats said. Washington wanted to make clear that Damascus cannot "duck and hide from the IAEA in respect to fulfilling obligations" by stonewalling agency inspection requests, the diplomat said.

IAEA Takes Harder Stand on Syria, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 1, 2011

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