Tag Archives: fissile material

Plutonium Production after Fukushima; the link between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons

Last year’s tsunami disaster in Japan clouded the nation’s nuclear future, idled its reactors and rendered its huge stockpile of plutonium useless for now. So, the industry’s plan to produce even more has raised a red flag.  Nuclear industry officials say they hope to start producing a half-ton of plutonium within months, in addition to the more than 35 tons Japan already has stored around the world. That’s even though all the reactors that might use it are either inoperable or offline while the country rethinks its nuclear policy after the tsunami-generated Fukushima crisis.

“It’s crazy,” said Princeton University professor Frank von Hippel, a leading authority on nonproliferation issues and a former assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology. “There is absolutely no reason to do that.”  Japan’s nuclear industry produces plutonium — which is strictly regulated globally because it also is used for nuclear weapons — by reprocessing spent, uranium-based fuel in a procedure aimed at decreasing radioactive waste that otherwise would require long-term storage.  The industry wants to reprocess more to build up reserves in anticipation of when it has a network of reactors that run on a next-generation fuel that includes plutonium and that can be reused in a self-contained cycle — but that much-delayed day is still far off.  Japanese officials argue that, once those plans are in place, the reactors will draw down the stockpile and use up most of it by 2030.  “There is no excess plutonium in this country,” said Koichi Imafuku, an official at the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. “It’s not just lying around without purpose.”

In the meantime, the country’s post-Fukushima review of nuclear policy is pitting a growing number of critics who want to turn away from plutonium altogether against an entrenched nuclear industry that wants to push forward with it.  Other countries, including the United States, have scaled back the separation of plutonium because it is a proliferation concern and is more expensive than other alternatives, including long-term storage of spent fuel.

Fuel reprocessing remains unreliable and it is questionable whether it is a viable way of reducing Japan’s massive amounts of spent fuel rods, said Takeo Kikkawa, a Hitotsubashi University professor specializing in energy issues.  “Japan should abandon the program altogether,” said Hideyuki Ban, co-director of a respected anti-nuclear Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. “Then we can also contribute to the global effort for nuclear non-proliferation.”

Von Hippel stressed that only two other countries reprocess on a large scale: France and Britain, and Britain has decided to stop. Japan’s civilian-use plutonium stockpile is already the fifth-largest in the world, and it has enough plutonium to make about 5,000 simple nuclear warheads, although it does not manufacture them.  Because of inherent dangers of plutonium stockpiles, government regulations require industry representatives to announce by March 31 how much plutonium they intend to produce in the year ahead and explain how they will use it.

But, for the second year in a row, the industry has failed to do so. They blame the government for failing to come up with a long-term policy after Fukushima, but say they nevertheless want to make more plutonium if they can get a reprocessing plant going by October.  Kimitake Yoshida, a spokesman for the Federation of Electric Power Companies, said the plutonium would be converted into MOX — a mixture of plutonium and uranium — which can be loaded back into reactors and reused in a cycle. But technical glitches, cost overruns and local opposition have kept Japan from actually putting the moving parts of that plan into action.

In the meantime, Japan’s plutonium stockpile — most of which is stored in France and Britain — has swelled despite Tokyo’s promise to international regulators not to produce a plutonium surplus.  Its plutonium holdings have increased fivefold from about 7 tons in 1993 to 37 tons at the end of 2010. Japan initially said the stockpile would shrink rapidly in early 2000s as its fuel cycle kicked in, but that hasn’t happened.

Critics argue that since no additional spent fuel is being created, and there are questions about how the plutonium would be used, this is not a good time start producing more. They also say it makes no sense for Japan to minimize its plutonium glut by calling it a “stockpile” rather than a “surplus.”  “It’s a simple accounting trick,” said Edwin Lyman, a physicist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. “It’s laughable. And it sends the wrong signal all around the world.”

Officials stress that, like other plutonium-holding nations, Japan files a yearly report detailing its stockpile with the International Atomic Energy Agency. But it has repeatedly failed to live up to its own schedules for how the plutonium will be used.  From 2006 until three years ago, the nuclear industry said the plutonium-consuming MOX fuel would be used in 16-18 conventional reactors “in or after” 2010. In fact, only two reactors used MOX that year. By the time of the earthquake and tsunami last year, the number was still just three — including one at the Fukushima plant.  In response to the delays, the industry has simply revised its plans farther off into the future. It is now shooting for the end of fiscal 2015.

“There really is a credibility problem here,” said Princeton’s von Hippel, who also is a member of the independent International Panel on Fissile Materials. “They keep making up these schedules which are never realized. I think the ship is sinking beneath them.”

By ERIC TALMADGE and MARI YAMAGUCHI, Japan to make more plutonium despite big stockpile, Associated Press, June 2, 2012

See also http://www.jnfl.co.jp/english/

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Treacherous Nuclear Disarmament

Dismantling nuclear weapons, Image from http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_11a.html

Is nuclear disarmament, however slowly, turning into something more than a slogan? When Barack Obama committed America, in a speech in Prague in April, to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons", he singled out two treaties as being essential first steps in realising his vision.One, agreed on years ago though still not in force, bans all nuclear testing. The other would end the production of fissile materials for bombs. Last week the 65-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) broke a decade-long stalemate, agreeing that negotiations on this treaty can now start. But how far will they get?

The agreement to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty (FMCT, to disarmament buffs) involved a patchwork of compromises. Until recently China, backed by Russia, had blocked the path, insisting that there must also be parallel talks on a treaty to curb an arms race in space (read: American missile defences). Instead there will be less formal "discussions". Two other working groups will explore more binding "negative security assurances" (promises by those that do have bombs not to use them against those that do not) and broader disarmament issues.

Yet an FMCT will still be hard to achieve. Even small diversions from civilian stocks can be militarily useful. According to recent studies published by the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, such cheating is hard even for the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear guardian that backs up the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to detect in a timely fashion.

And that points to the deal's most controversial compromise. The Bush administration had opposed negotiating a "verifiable" FMCT, as the original mandate required, on the ground that if they could be made effective at all, international inspections would be too costly and intrusive for governments to tolerate. Instead America supported a less ambitious treaty that relied on "national means and measures" (spy satellites and the like), which few others have. The treaty to be negotiated is now supposedly back to being "verifiable", but it remains to be seen whether the CD can agree on how to do that.

The politics are as treacherous as the technicalities. North Korea eventually signed up last week, but it had just staged a bomb test that brought swift condemnation from the UN Security Council and had announced that it is stepping up plutonium production. It may enrich uranium too. Hardly encouraging.

Some governments had found the old, inflexible America useful to hide behind and will miss it. India could profess its commitment to an FMCT, thus burnishing its non-proliferation "credentials" despite the fact that it had built and tested bombs outside the NPT, in the certain knowledge that it could go on churning out weapons materials regardless. The treaty is still far from being agreed on, but India's ambassador to the CD insisted her country would accept no obligations that hinder its "strategic programme".

Pakistan, seeing itself at a disadvantage to its bigger rival, has long argued that past stocks should be monitored too. India says no. With China's help, Pakistan had already been expanding fissile-material production. It was alarmed by a controversial nuclear deal between America and India last year that created a loophole in anti-nuclear rules. This allows India, uniquely among those like Pakistan and Israel that have stayed outside the NPT, to get civilian nuclear help and fuel from abroad. Inevitably India will now be able to direct more of its scarcer domestic uranium to its military needs. That development and talk of an FMCT, however remote, will in all probability encourage Pakistan to make the stuff even faster still.

At home, Mr Obama will have a fight to persuade the necessary two-thirds of the Senate to ratify the other treaty deemed essential for progress in disarmament: the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It was rejected in 1999, on a partisan vote. Mr Obama's Democrats have more seats this time, but still not enough. Debate will once again revolve around whether a test ban can be properly verified, and whether America can afford to do without testing indefinitely (it stopped in 1992) as its own nuclear warheads age.

But some things have changed in ten years. At home, powerful computers for modelling test explosions have managed to solve problems that had once had even the testers stumped, and America's warheads have been shown to be more robust than first thought. The global system of monitoring stations being built to back up the CTBT was just a plan in 1999 but is now nearing completion (with some in America). North Korea's second nuclear test, in May, was also a test of the system's capabilities which it passed easily.

A concern has resurfaced that Russia, which has ratified, might be cheating by conducting very small nuclear tests, although America formally withdrew this complaint some years ago. Where such doubts arise (some also suspect China), there is provision for on-site inspection.

But as things stand, such inspections can be invoked only with the treaty in force. Several required ratifications are still outstanding. America's could prompt China, and a couple of others, to follow suit. But India will not even sign the CTBT, let alone ratify it. Pakistan will not if India does not. And North Korea clearly is not in the mood.

Banning bomb materials and bomb tests: Making a start, Economist, June 4, 2009

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