Category Archives: nuclear weapons

The Lure of Impossible: Choking Uranium Markets

The Rössing Uranium Mine in Namibia

Making nuclear weapons requires access to materials—highly enriched uranium or plutonium—that do not exist in nature in a weapons-usable form.   The most important suppliers of nuclear technology have recently agreed guidelines to restrict access to the most sensitive industrial items, in the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Nevertheless, the number of countries proficient in these industrial processes has increased over time, and it is now questionable whether a strategy based on close monitoring of technology ‘choke points’ is by itself a reliable barrier to nuclear proliferation.  Time to tighten regulation of the uranium market?

Not all the states that have developed a complex nuclear fuel cycle have naturally abundant uranium. This has created a global market for uranium that is relatively free—particularly compared with the market for sensitive technologies....

Many African states have experienced increased investment in their uranium extractive sectors in recent years. Many, though not all, have signed and ratified the 1996 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Pelindaba) Treaty, which entered into force in 2009. Furthermore, in recent years, the relevant countries have often worked with the IAEA to introduce an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the agency...

One proliferation risk inherent in the current system is that inadequate or falsified information connected to what appear to be legitimate transactions will facilitate uranium acquisition by countries that the producer country would not wish to supply....

A second risk is that uranium ore concentrate (UOC) is diverted, either from the site where it was processed or during transportation, so the legitimate owners no longer have control over it. UOC is usually produced at facilities close to mines—often at the mining site itself—to avoid the cost and inconvenience of transporting large quantities of very heavy ore in raw form to a processing plant.,,,UOC is usually packed into steel drums that are loaded into standard shipping containers for onward movement by road, rail or sea for further processing. The loss of custody over relatively small quantities of UOC represents a serious risk if diversion takes place regularly. The loss of even one full standard container during transport would be a serious proliferation risk by itself. There is thus a need for physical protection of the ore concentrate to reduce the risk of diversion at these stages.

A third risk is that some uranium extraction activity is not covered by the existing rules. For example, uranium extraction can be a side activity connected to gold mining or the production of phosphates. Regulations should cover all activities that could lead to uranium extraction, not only those where uranium extraction is the main stated objective.

Restricting access to natural uranium could be an important aspect of the global efforts to obstruct the spread of nuclear weapons...

Excerpts, from  Ian Anthony and Lina Grip, The global market in natural uranium—from proliferation risk to non-proliferation opportunity, SIPRI, Apr. 13, 2013

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The Costs of Covert Operations in Pursuit of Regime Change in Iran

USB_flash_drive.  Image from wikipedia

Washington believed that covert action against Iran’s nuclear facilities would be more effective and less risky than an all-out war... In fact, Mark Fitzpatrick, former deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation said: “Industrial sabotage is a way to stop the programme, without military action, without fingerprints on the operation, and really, it is ideal, if it works.”The US has a long history of covert operations in Iran, beginning in 1953 with the CIA orchestrated coup d’état that toppled the popularly elected Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh and installed a dictator, Reza Shah. The US has reorganised its covert operations after the collapse of the shah in 1979...

In January 2011, it was revealed that the Stuxnet cyber-attack, an American-Israeli project to sabotage the Iranian nuclear programme, has been accelerated since President Barack Obama first took office. Referring to comments made by the head of Mossad, then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton confirmed the damages inflicted on Iran’s nuclear programme have been achieved through a combination of “sabotage and sanctions”.

Meanwhile, several Iranian nuclear scientists were assassinated. The New York Times reported that Mossad orchestrated the killings while Iran claimed the attacks were part of a covert campaign by the US, UK and Israel to sabotage its nuclear programme....

There are at least 10 major repercussions arising from the US, West and Israeli policy of launching covert war and cyber-attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities and scientists.

First, cyber war is a violation of international law. According to the UN Charter, the use of force is allowed only with the approval of the UN Security Council in self-defence and in response to an attack by another country. A Nato-commissioned international group of researchers, concluded that the 2009 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities constituted “an act of force”, noting that the cyber-attack has been a violation of international law.Second, the US covert operations are a serious violation of the Algiers Accord. The 1981 Algiers Accords agreed upon between Iran and the US clearly stated that “it is and from now on will be the policy of the US not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran’s internal affairs”.

Third, the cyber war has propelled Tehran to become more determined in its nuclear efforts and has made major advancement. According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), prior to covert operations targeting the nuclear programme, Iran had one uranium enrichment site, a pilot plant of 164 centrifuges enriching uranium at a level of 3.5 per cent, first generation of centrifuges and approximately 100 kg stockpile of enriched uranium.Today, it has two enrichment sites with roughly 12,000 centrifuges, can enrich uranium up to 20 per cent, possesses a new generation of centrifuges and has amassed a stockpile of more than 8,000kg of enriched uranium.

Fourth, the strategy pursued has constituted a declaration of war on Iran, and a first strike. Stuxnet cyber-attack did cause harm to Iran’s nuclear programme, therefore it can be considered the first unattributed act of war against Iran, a dangerous prelude toward a broader war.

Fifth... [s]uch short-sighted policies thicken the wall of mistrust, further complicating US-Iran rapprochement and confidence-building measures.

Sixth, Iran would consider taking retaliatory measures by launching cyber-counter-attacks against facilities in Israel, the West and specifically the US...

Seventh, Iran is building a formidable domestic capacity countering and responding to western cyber-warfare. Following the Stuxnet attack, Iran’s Supreme Leader issued a directive to establish Iran’s cyber army that is both offensive and defensive. Today, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has the fourth biggest cyber army in the world. Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) acknowledged that IRGC is one of the most advanced nations in the field of cyberspace warfare.

Eighth, Iran now has concluded that information gathered by IAEA inspectors has been used to create computer viruses, facilitate sabotage against its nuclear programme and the assassinations of nuclear scientists. Iranian nuclear energy chief stated that the UN nuclear watchdog [IAEA] has been infiltrated by “terrorists and saboteurs.” Such conclusions have not only discredited the UN Nuclear Watchdog but have pushed Iran to limit its technical and legal cooperation with the IAEA to address outstanding concerns and questions.

Ninth, worsening Iranians siege mentality by covert actions and violations of the country’s territorial sovereignty could strengthen the radicals in Tehran to double down on acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran could be pondering now the reality that the US is not waging a covert war on North Korea (because it possesses a nuclear bomb), Muammar Gaddafi lost his grip on power in Libya after ceding his nuclear programme, and Iraq and Afghanistan were invaded (because they had no nuclear weapon).

Tenth, the combination of cyber-attacks, industrial sabotage and assassination of scientists has turned public opinion within Iran against western interference within the country...[P]rovocative western measures have convinced the Iranian government that the main issue is not the nuclear programme but rather regime change.

Excerpts from  Seyed Hossein Mousavian, Ten consequences of US covert war against Iran, Gulf News, May 11, 2013

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The Sanction Busters: Iran

Fujairah UAE

The past 15 months have been grim for Iranian businesses which trade with the outside world. America has tightened sanctions against Iran’s financial system; the European Union has put an embargo on its oil; and international traders are wary of dealing with the country.Iranian businesses are used to fighting for survival. The Islamic Republic has faced sanctions of one sort or another since its creation in 1979. Parts for Iran’s ageing civilian airliners trickle in from the black market. A host of sanctioned products, from industrial chemicals to anti-aircraft missiles, come from China. Almost any good can be found in Iran, at a price.  Amir, a manager in a mining business, says he regularly meets British and German suppliers in Turkey, to obtain the most advanced equipment to tap Iran’s mineral wealth. “Foreign firms are terrified of doing something illegal, but in the end they are businessmen,” he says. “The Europeans send our cargoes to Dubai, documented as the final destination. From there we are in charge.” Amir uses Gulf middlemen to change the documents, for a fee of 3-5%, before the goods are shipped to Bandar Abbas, Iran’s largest port.

Because few international banks deal with sanctioned Iranian institutions, Iranian importers have to find roundabout ways of paying suppliers. Amir uses a network of Iranian go-betweens who own companies in South Africa and Malaysia to pay his suppliers’ Western banks. He says 30% of his revenues are spent on avoiding sanctions—not counting the time involved.

The sanctions have hit Iran’s oil industry the hardest. Iran’s government depends on oil for more than half of its revenue, but exports have fallen and grown more volatile. The country’s total production is a quarter less than the 3.6m barrels per day it pumped in 2011.  One way of keeping sales going is to dress up Iranian oil as Iraqi. Another trick is to move Iranian oil onto foreign tankers on the open sea. Once crews have switched off their ships’ tracking beacons, this is all but undetectable. The oil is sold at a discount. Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is a big market for Iranian oil. Business is down, says Sajad, but European firms still trade with Iran, using Swiss subsidiaries which broker deals with the Iranians and collect the crude using tankers under the flag of a third country.

The sanctions have been a fillip for the few institutions still handling Iranian money. One foreign bank charges 5% on cash moving in or out of Iran, says an Iranian shipping source. Normal business rates are a fraction of a percent, but Iranian firms have little choice.

Sometimes the fear of sanctions is more effective than the sanctions themselves. A customer in the UAE owed $1.3m to Sajad’s shipping firm but would only send it in costly small instalments. Sajad flew to the Gulf to pick up the balance in cash. “I was nervous about what I would say to customs from either country if they checked my suitcase,” he says. “I decided I would tell the truth. I am not a criminal.” But no one did.

Dodging sanctions in Iran: Around the block, Economist, Mar. 3, 2013, at 68?

Sanctions Against Iran and the Afghan Loophole

How Iran Copes with Actions?

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How to Survive a Nuclear Conflict–DARPA Seeks New Tools

he BADGER explosion on April 18, 1953, as part of Operation Upshot-Knothole, at the Nevada Test Site.  Image from wikipedia

The release of nuclear material at the Fukushima nuclear reactor after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake raised concerns regarding U.S. preparedness to treat large-scale exposure of citizens and military personnel to ionizing radiation. The immediate destructive potential of nuclear and radiological weapons, as well as their long-term public health and economic impacts, continue to be of concern to the Department of Defense. In light of the diverse, persistent, and substantial threat posed by ionizing radiation from nuclear and/or radiological weapons, DARPA is requesting information on novel therapies, methods, devices, protocols, compounds, and/or systems to mitigate the dangers that ionizing radiation poses to human health. As part of this investigation, a better understanding of the effects of chronic, acute, environmental, and internal ionizing radiation exposure on mutagenesis, cellular life-cycle, immunology, and metabolism is expected to be fruitful and lead to new areas of research...

DSO [DARPA's Defense Sciences Office] is seeking innovative ideas that may be used to help inform a potential new program focused on demonstrating novel methods for mitigating the susceptibility of victims exposed to large doses of ionizing radiation over a range of temporal scales.

Topic Area One: Acute Interventions

DARPA is interested in novel approaches to mitigating the immediate, toxic effects associated with exposure to high doses of ionizing radiation. Concepts of interest under this Topic Area include, but are not limited to, the following:

---Prophylactic interventions that can be delivered prior to ionizing radiation exposure that protect against the immediate toxic effects of ionizing radiation to ensure survivability even at high irradiation doses.

---Post-exposure interventions that can be delivered as late as possible following irradiation while still ensuring survivability against the acute effects of ionizing radiation exposure.

Topic Area Two: Long Term Survival

DARPA is interested in novel intervention technologies for ensuring/enhancing survival against the long-term effects of ionizing radiation including cancers attributed to cellular damage and mutagenesis...

With the possibility of new therapies that enable survival in individuals who may have been exposed to doses of ionizing radiation that would normally be considered lethal, it now becomes even more important to understand the mechanisms of injury, including the effects of ionization within cells, mutagenesis and free radical formation that can lead to mortality from stochastic radiation effects.

Technical approaches of interest may address the need to improve our understanding of the contributions of immune system, cellular, and DNA damage to the deleterious effects of ionizing radiation on health, as well as propose novel therapeutic approaches for mitigating these effects. For example, some antioxidants (e.g., superoxide dismutase (SOD), SOD-mimetics, selenomethionine, Hirsutella sinensis, and others) have been shown to produce in vivo activity that can suppress lethality while other antioxidants (e.g., WR-2721, beta-carotene, caffeine and others) can mitigate mutagenesis and/or chromosomal aberrations.3,4,5 Some antioxidants, such as tocopherol-monoglucoside (TMG), produce in vivo activity that may mitigate both the acute lethal effects and longer term mutagenesis and chromosomal aberration effects of exposure to ionizing radiation. Understanding how these compounds act to reduce morbidity and mortality may pave the way to new, more effective therapies and protocols.

Excerpts from Source:  Reducing Ionizing Radiation Risk, Solicitation Number: DARPA-SN-13-24, Feb. 20, 2013

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Nuclear Pro-proliferation Friends? Myanmar

A Republican senator is asking Myanmar’s president for answers over the reported seizure of a ship’s cargo bound for Myanmar with potential nuclear uses.   Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper reported North Korea tried to ship materials suitable for uranium enrichment or missile development to Myanmar via China. It said Japanese authorities seized metal pipes and high-specification aluminum alloy at U.S. request when the ship docked in Tokyo in August.

Sen. Richard Lugar, a leading voice in Congress on nonproliferation, wrote Tuesday to Myanmar’s President Thein Sein, urging him to disclose the intended recipient of the materials and their planned use. The Associated Press obtained a copy of the letter Thursday.  The reported seizure heightens concern over whether Myanmar is making good on promises to sever military ties with North Korea, believed to have assisted Myanmar in ballistic missile technology. Myanmar denies having sought nuclear assistance.

Lugar commended reformist leader Thein Sein for recently agreeing to sign up an international agreement that would allow greater U.N. scrutiny of any nuclear activities.  He said the reported Japanese seizure also provided an opportunity for the Myanmar government to demonstrate transparency.  “Peace and stability within ASEAN are potentially impacted by the intended purpose of the ship’s cargo,” Lugar wrote. ASEAN is Southeast Asia’s regional bloc and Myanmar is a member.  Thein Sein has ushered in democratic reforms after decades of direct military rule, helping end the nation’s international isolation. Earlier this month, Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to visit the country, also known as Burma.

US senator writes Myanmar leader over reported seizure of suspect North Korean cargo, Associated Press, Nov. 30, 2012

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The Swiss Nuke Smugglers, CIA and Libya

Three Swiss engineers are set to escape jail for nuclear smuggling, in part because they helped the CIA bust a global ring that was supplying Libya's atomic weapons program.  Urs Tinner, his brother Marco, and their father Friedrich are accused of aiding the smuggling network of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.  But according to Swiss prosecution documents released Tuesday setting out a plea bargain deal, the three also cooperated with U.S. authorities who were able to seize a shipment of nuclear equipment destined for Libya in 2003.  The CIA operation ultimately destroyed the Khan network and Libya gave up its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

Prosecutors say their work was hampered by the Swiss government's decision to destroy key evidence in the case.  The plea bargain will be put before a Swiss court for approval next week.

Swiss nuke smugglers who helped CIA to escape jail, Associated Press, Sept. 18, 2012

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The Nuclear Proliferation Potential of Laser Enrichment

The following is being released by Physicians for Social Responsibility:  The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is putting U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy at risk if it decides not to require a formal nuclear proliferation assessment as part of the licensing process for a uranium laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, N.C.  That’s the message from 19 nuclear non-proliferation experts in a letter sent today asking the NRC to fulfill its statutory responsibility to assess proliferation threats related to the technologies it regulates. The letter is available online at http://www.psr.org/nrcassessment.

Global Laser Enrichment, LLC, a joint venture of General Electric (USA), Hitachi (Japan) and Cameco (Canada), has applied for a license to operate a laser enrichment facility in Wilmington, North Carolina, based on Australian SILEX technology. The NRC licensing review schedule sets September 30, 2012 as the date of license issuance.  One of the authors of the letter, Catherine Thomasson, MD, executive director, Physicians for Social Responsibility, said:“It is a widely shared view that laser enrichment could be an undetectable stepping-stone to a clandestine nuclear weapons program. To strengthen U.S. policy and protect the U.S. and the world from nuclear proliferation, the NRC should systematically and thoroughly assess the proliferation risks of any new uranium enrichment technology BEFORE issuing a license allowing their development.”  Dr. Ira Helfand, co-president of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, said: “If the U.S. is going to have moral authority in dealing with proliferation threats in other nations, such as Iran, it must do a better job of taking responsible steps in relation to proliferation threats in our own backyard. In fact, a persuasive case can be made that laser enrichment technology requires even more immediate action, since this is a known danger that can be addressed directly by the NRC under its existing regulatory authority.”

In the letter, the experts note that the NRC has no rules or requirements for a nuclear proliferation assessment as part of this licensing process. The experts are concerned that the Commission is falling short in its duties since a 2008 NRC manual on enrichment technology clearly states that laser enrichment presents “extra proliferation concerns due to the small size and high separation factors.”

Previous letters to the NRC asking for a proliferation assessment, signed by many of today’s signatories, have been rebuffed. NRC is on record stating that the National Environmental Policy Act does not require preparation of a proliferation assessment. However, a March 27, 2012 memorandum from the Congressional Research Service clearly concludes that the NRC has legal authority “to promulgate a regulation” requiring a proliferation assessment as part of the licensing process.  Both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Atomic Energy Act are cited by the experts as statutory basis of the NRC’s responsibility to assess proliferation risks.

Excerpt, 19 Experts: Nuclear Proliferation Risks Of Laser Enrichment Require Fuller NRC Review, PRNewswire, Sept 5, 201

Proliferation Risks of Laser Enrichment

Laser Uranium Enrichment

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Financial Sanctions Against Iran and the Afghan Loophole

With American and European sanctions spurring a currency crisis in Iran, officials say a growing number of Iranians are packing trucks with devalued rials and heading to the freewheeling currency market next door in American-occupied Afghanistan, to trade for dollars.  The rial has lost more than half its value against the dollar, and cross-border bank transfers and currency exchanges have become difficult, as sanctions have slashed Iran’s vital oil revenue and cut the country off from international financial markets. Iranian businesses and individuals are desperate to avoid further losses, by converting their money and moving it out for safekeeping. At the same time, the government is trying to find alternate ways to bring in hard currency.

Enter Afghanistan, where dollars function as a second national currency after years of Western spending and where financial oversight is so lax that billions of dollars in cash leave the country every year. Though Afghan and Western officials say they cannot put a precise figure on the trade with Iran, they see it as a potential challenge to the sanctions, and one that the United States, as Afghanistan’s main benefactor, helped create.  The Iranians are “in essence using our own money, and they’re getting around what we’re trying to enforce,” one American official said.  It is a new iteration of an enduring problem in Afghanistan, where Western officials are already struggling to quell a storm of corruption that has undercut the war effort. In the years since the invasion, the country has become a smuggler’s dream, with a booming opium economy and pervasive government graft that is widely believed to be a factor in funneling Western aid money to the Taliban.

On its own, the rush of Iranian money to Afghanistan is unlikely to be enough to undercut the sanctions, which are the cornerstone of Western efforts to coerce Iran into abandoning its nuclear program. But it is clear that American officials are worried. In one indication, President Obama last month quietly strengthened the sanctions by giving the Treasury Department the capacity to punish any person who buys dollars or precious metals, like gold, on behalf of the Iranian government.  “We are taking steps to make it more difficult for the government of Iran to satisfy its heightened demand for dollars — and making it clear to anyone who provides dollars to the government that they face sanctions,” said David S. Cohen, the Treasury Department under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence.

Afghan money traders said they were told this month by American officials to not conduct business with Arian Bank, an Afghan bank owned by a pair of Iranian banks. The Treasury Department has maintained sanctions against the Afghan and Iranian banks in the past few years, and the traders said they had been recently told that the Afghan bank was being used by the Iranian government to move cash in and out of Afghanistan.  Western and Afghan officials, as well as traders in Afghan money markets, said that a number of Iranians had started seeking to buy dollars and euros with their rials as American and European sanctions tightened over the past year.  The purchases are part of efforts by wealthy and middle-class Iranians to protect their savings and business profits by moving them offshore. But with legitimate transfers out of Iran virtually impossible because of the sanctions, Iranians are instead converting their rials in Afghanistan, and then moving the money to banks in the Persian Gulf and beyond.  “The middle class is in a panic about what to do right now,” said Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, an economist at Virginia Tech and an expert on Iran’s economy.

More troublingly, in the eyes of Western officials, the Iranian government is seeking to bolster its reserves of dollars, euros and precious metals to stabilize its exchange rates and ensure that it can pay for imports. Iran had about $110 billion in foreign currency and precious metal reserves in 2011, and those are believed to be dwindling now.  Afghan traders have proved more than willing to trade dollars for rials, usable as a currency in many parts of western Afghanistan, at advantageous exchange rates. Hajji Najeeb Ullah Akhtary, the president of Afghanistan’s Money Exchange Union, an association of traditional money transfer and exchange businesses that are known as hawalas, said he and his members had seen a steady increase in Iranians bringing cash into Afghanistan over the past year. That comes on top of routine transfers made by Afghans living and working in Iran, including more than one million impoverished refugees, and the regular supply of rials that circulates in Afghanistan.  The cash “comes across in trucks,” he said, with transfers arranged by Afghan middlemen who take a 5 to 7 percent commission.

Iranians were converting rials into dollars in Kabul, the western border city of Herat and in the southern cities of Kandahar and Ghazni, Mr. Akhtary said. The transactions were largely conducted through hawalas, which allow people to transfer large sums of money for small fees to relatives or business associates in distant locales within minutes. The dealers in various places cover one another to make the system work, and settle up after the fact.  The markets are often ramshackle affairs that give little hint of the vast sums being moved. Kabul’s hawala market, for instance, is little more than a few dingy lanes hidden away on the banks of the Kabul River, a trickle of fetid water that winds along trash-strewed banks. But it does huge business. Outside its storefronts, men sit on the pavement behind rickety tables piled high with afghanis, Pakistani rupees, American dollars and Iranian rials, among other currencies.  One hawala dealer, Hajji Ahmed Shah Hakimi, said two routes were primarily used to bring cash in from Iran: one directly across the border with Iran and another through Pakistan.  Both he and Mr. Akhtary insisted that they were not involved in smuggling cash for Iranians or anyone else, but that other hawala traders were.

Mr. Hakimi said the sanctions on Iran were seen in Afghanistan as an American issue, and that is why some Afghans had no problem smuggling money for Iranians. Some Afghan officials echoed that view, saying the Iranian money flow was not a top concern, though the broader problem of bulk cash smuggling was.  The flow of cash in and out of Afghanistan goes largely unmonitored and unimpeded, a “country-sized” money-laundering operation, said a European forensic auditor who has tracked financial crime in Afghanistan and spoke on the condition of anonymity.

In 2011, an estimated $4.6 billion, a sum equivalent to roughly a third of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, was stuffed into suitcases, shrink-wrapped onto pallets or packed into boxes and flown out of Kabul’s airport on commercial airline flights, most of them headed for Dubai, United Arab Emirates, according to the central bank.  Though new rules and better enforcement have begun to cut into the cash flying out of Kabul, it is anyone’s guess how much moved out of Afghanistan overland on trucks or on twice-weekly flights to Dubai from Kandahar in southern Afghanistan, said an Afghan official who tracks suspicious financial transactions and spoke on the condition of anonymity.  “Kandahar?” he said. “We have no idea what is going there.”

By MATTHEW ROSENBERG and ANNIE LOWREY, Iranian Currency Traders Find a Haven in Afghanistan, NY Times, Aug. 17, 2012

See also Financial Sanctions against Iran and the Chinese Loophole

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The Y-12: nuclear weapons alive and well

Nearly three weeks after a stunning security breach shut down the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant, the government on Wednesday  (August 15, 2012)-

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United Arab Emirates Push Ahead with Nuclear Energy Plans

The Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) announced today the results of the nuclear fuel procurement competition launched in July 2011. The goal of the fuel competition is to create a strategy to cover supply for the first 15 years of operations.  A portfolio of leading international nuclear fuel suppliers have been contracted to provide a series of nuclear fuel services to cover ENEC’s requirements. The resulting fuel strategy guarantees security of supply, quality assurance of fuel-related materials and competitive commercial terms to protect the interests of the UAE peaceful nuclear energy program by providing volume flexibilities and the ability to adapt to changing market conditions.

The following services have been contracted by ENEC:

• Purchase of natural uranium concentrates

• Conversion services (in which uranium concentrates are converted to material ready for enrichment)

• Enrichment services (in which the converted material is enriched to a level that is used in the fuel for nuclear energy plants)

• Purchase of enriched uranium product

The enriched uranium will be supplied to KEPCO Nuclear Fuels (KNF), which will manufacture the fuel assemblies for use in the four planned UAE units. KNF is a member of ENEC’s Prime Contract consortium, led by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO).

Starting in 2014 - 2015, a total of six leading companies in the nuclear fuel supply industry will participate in the ENEC fuel supply program. ConverDyn (U.S.) will provide conversion services; Uranium One, Inc. (Canada) will provide natural uranium, URENCO (headquartered in the U.K) will provide enrichment services; and Rio Tinto (headquartered in the U.K) will provide natural uranium. TENEX (Russia) will supply uranium concentrates, conversion services and enrichment services. AREVA (France) will provide uranium concentrates, conversion services and enrichment services.

The six contracts are valued at approximately US$3 billion according to ENEC forecasts. The contracted fuel will enable the Barakah plant to generate up to 450 million MWh for a period of 15 years starting in 2017, when the first nuclear energy unit is scheduled to begin providing safe, clean, reliable and efficient electricity to the UAE.

“The completion of the fuel supply strategy is a key achievement to ENEC’s program and a clear example of how the UAE continues to set the gold standard for implementing a peaceful nuclear energy program,” said ENEC’s Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Al Hammadi. “These contracts will provide ENEC with long-term security of supply, high quality fuel and favorable pricing and commercial terms. We are also pleased that this marks the start of long-term commercial relationships with companies that have earned excellent reputations in the industry.”

The ENEC fuel procurement strategy is guided by the Government of the United Arab Emirates’ support for international non-proliferation efforts. That support was detailed in a nuclear energy policy document released by the government in April 2008 that outlined a series of commitments, including the decision to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel. That commitment was ratified by UAE Federal Law in 2009.

The procurement competition was the result of an extensive year-long process that included initial discussions between ENEC and international nuclear fuel suppliers. It was conducted in line with the industry’s best practices, under which companies contract for the various aspects of the fuel cycle as a means to ensure security of supply, high quality fuel and commercial advantage. In addition, this process will enable ENEC to build a strategic commercial capability in nuclear fuel procurement. The comprehensive analysis performed by ENEC included a peer review system to ensure that the procurement process was performed according to global standards.

ENEC expects to return to the market at various times to take advantage of favorable market conditions and to strengthen its security of supply position.  ENEC is planning to build four 1,400-MW nuclear energy units at the recently approved site, Barakah, in the Western Region of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, in order to provide the electricity needed to fuel the economic growth of the UAE. In July, ENEC received regulatory approval from both the Environment Agency of Abu Dhabi and the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation for the construction of the first two nuclear energy units in Barakah.  Pending further regulatory approvals, the first unit is scheduled to begin delivering electricity to the grid in 2017. The remaining three units are scheduled to come on line in 2018, 2019 and 2020.

Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation Awards Nuclear Fuel Supply Contracts, Nuclear Street News, Aug 15 2012

See also UAE goes Forward with its Nuclear Energy Program

The Quiet Nuclearization of the Middle East, UAE

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