More Dumping in the Baltic

February 9th, 2010

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/92/Baltic_Sea_map.png

Environmentalists herald Sweden as one of the top fighters of global warming. The country is aiming for an oil-free economy by 2020. A key index compiled by U.S. researchers ranks Sweden as one of the best pollution-controllers in the world.  But news is emerging that “green” Sweden may have a skeleton in its closet.

A report broadcast Wednesday on the Swedish public television station SVT suggested that government officials stood by and did nothing while Russia allegedly dumped nuclear waste into Swedish waters in the Baltic Sea in the early 1990s. Evidence of a cover-up since then has the country’s current politicians pointing fingers and demanding explanations.  Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt’s government says it knew nothing about Russia allegedly dumping toxic chemicals in its waters in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The station quotes former Swedish officials – a secret service agent and a political adviser to a former foreign minister – as saying Russia dumped radioactive waste off the shores of Sweden’s island province of Gotland in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as the Soviet Union was collapsing. Russian vessels used the cover of night to stealthily sink dozens of barrels of chemical weapons and nuclear material, it reported.  “They just sailed out at night and dumped in two areas,” secret service agent Donald Forsberg told SVT.

His account was corroborated by Sven Olof Pettersson, a political adviser to Anna Lindh, who was Sweden’s foreign minister from 1998 until her murder by a mentally deranged man in a department store in 2003. Before that, Lindh served as Sweden’s environment minister from 1994 to 1998.  Pettersson was quoted as saying that Lindh learned of Russia’s dumping either during her time as environment minister or just after she became foreign minister, and tried in vain to launch a public inquiry. He said he clearly remembers her anger over the matter.

The program suggests that Lindh didn’t manage to start an investigation because of a cover-up by unnamed senior government officials who thought a probe would be too costly and difficult.  Sweden’s public prosecutor is now investigating those claims. The Stockholm News reports the prosecutor, Mats Palm, has known some details about the dumping and alleged cover-up since last year, but that the SVT program provided more crucial information.

“We believe that we have reached the stage where we can initiate an investigation, and the reason is that we can presume crimes,” Palm told the Swedish news agency TT. He added that he would search for memos from the Swedish military intelligence agency, which might contain clues to what authorities knew about the toxic waste dumping, and when.  “This is a very, very difficult investigation. It happened far back in time, and you may have to find the position of where the dumping took place, what it exactly is, and if it is leaking,” Palm said.

The allegations of contamination and cover-up come days ahead of the Baltic Sea Action Summit scheduled for Feb. 10 in Helsinki, where regional leaders — including Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin — plan to gather to discuss anti-pollution measures.  Because the Baltic Sea is landlocked except for a narrow strait between Sweden and Denmark, it takes longer to flush out toxins and is more vulnerable to buildup of pollutants. Its coasts and the rivers that feed into the sea run alongside some of northern Europe’s largest industrial centers – places like St. Petersburg in Russia. About 85 million people live in the sea’s drainage basin.

In this case, the nuclear waste dumped in the Baltic is alleged to have come from the vast Karosta naval base in the Latvian city of Liepaja.  The Russian Embassy in Stockholm said it couldn’t comment until Moscow investigates the issue.  So far the only comment from Russia has been from a leading scientist who is now in the leadership of the country’s opposition Green Party. Aleksej Jablokov told Radio Sweden he doesn’t believe any nuclear waste was dropped in the Baltic in the early 1990s. At the time, he was working for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, leading an inquiry into nuclear dumping in the Arctic. Jablokov said he knew only of smaller quantities of waste with lower-level radioactivity having been dumped in the Baltic in the 1950s and 60s.

“For this to have been done in the 1990s is very different from if it had occurred in the 1940s or in the beginning of the 1950s, when there were no international regulations. International environmental issues did not have at all the same focus as they did later on,” Jonas Ebbesson, professor of environmental law at Stockholm University, told SVT.  For now, Sweden’s current government is careful to skirt blame. A spokesman for Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt told Radio Sweden he “didn’t know about the issue.”  “This is new information for the current government. What we are saying is that questions should be directed to the previous governments,” Roberta Alenius was quoted as saying.

Foreign Minister Carl Bildt told the Stockholm News he too wants to hear from the former administration. “For some reason, when the previous government received the information, they decided not to take any action. And I want to know a bit more about what was the basis for that assessment,” Bildt said.  But the Swedish parliamentarian who represents Gotland province, where the contamination is said to have occurred, issued a news release saying “the most important thing now is not to find someone to blame.  “”If the details of the dumping are correct, then it is something that affects all of the Baltic Sea states,” lawmaker Rolf Nilsson wrote. “The most important thing is to locate the dumped barrels and identify their contents.”

Lauren Frayerm, WorldSweden Probes Suspected Nuclear Dumping in BalticUpdated, AOL News, Feb. 5, 2010

When Export Controls are Beginning to Bite

February 8th, 2010

Iran's nucler sites.  Image from BBC 

Australia has blocked three cargo shipments to Iran under laws aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd said Thursday.  Defence Minister John Faulkner invoked the rarely used Weapons of Mass Destruction Act to block the shipments, Rudd said.  “If you look at the threat to regional and global peace which Iran poses in its current nuclear weapons programme, there is no alternative other than robust international action including in areas such as this,” Rudd told public broadcaster ABC.  “”We believe that national security, the national security interests of Australia, also demand this course of action,” he added.

The centre-left leader would not be drawn on the contents of the shipments, saying only that Australia had acted “because we believe we must play the role of a responsible international citizen.”  The Australian newspaper reported that at least one of the banning orders, all made in recent months, blocked a cargo of pumps which could have been used to cool nuclear power plants.  “If you look at the status of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, and their consistent thumbing of the nose to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the international community more broadly… there are no alternatives other than to maintain a hard line,” Rudd said.  The United States and key allies Wednesday urged Iran to follow up on a surprise statement from President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by formally committing to a UN-brokered deal to swap enriched uranium for nuclear fuel.

Ahmadinejad’s apparent overture was overshadowed by a rocket launch into space, which heightened fears Iran was developing ballistic weapons and was condemned by the White House as “a provocative act.”  The West fears Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme is masking efforts to produce atomic weapons, a claim vehemently rejected by the Islamic republic.  Iran strongly denies that either its space or atomic energy programmes are intended to build a bomb.

Australia blocks Iran shipments over weapons fears: PM, Agence France Press, Feb. 4, 2010

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Trepidations

February 5th, 2010

Crater from the 1962 "Sedan" nuclear test as part of Operation Plowshare. The 104 kiloton blast displaced 12 million tons of earth and created a crater 320 feet deep and 1,280 feet wide, Image and info from wikipedia 

A two-day workshop focused on global nuclear disarmament efforts was conducted this week in the Philippines in preparation for the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference.  More than 50 nuclear experts were in Manila for talks on establishing a fissile material cutoff treaty and the ramifications of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Also to be addressed at the workshop were U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s plan for global nuclear disarmament, North Korea’s nuclear activities, the successor treaty to the expired Russia-U.S. Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and a 1995 resolution that calls for a nuclear weapon-free Middle East.  “The workshop will focus on how to strengthen the review process. It will set the benchmark that will lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” said Filipino Ambassador Libran Cabactulan who is expected to chair the review conference when it meets this May at the United Nations in New York.

The Philippines collaborated with Austria and Norway to put on the workshop, which involved participation from 37 NPT member nations, six global groups and six nongovernmental organizations, according to Cabactulan .Cabactulan told Kyodo he had “cautious optimism” that the review conference would result in improvements to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  “Despite the inspiring statements of global leaders the differences in position, the disparity right now on the table is still huge and enormous,” he said.

The end result of the conference, last held in 2005 in a meeting that closed in failure, “will depend highly on the political will, the flexibility that the state parties and negotiators will bring into the 2010 review conference itself and maybe in the lead-up to that,” according to Cabactulan.  “I think we have to manage the expectation of the international community and everybody while at the same time continue to push the negotiators,” he said. “It is very important that the treaty becomes strong and achieves its purpose” .

Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo said it was important for his country to address the nuclear threat as so many Filipinos are living in areas where the spread of nuclear weapons is taking place or that are considered vulnerable to a nuclear attack, the Xinhua News Agency reported.  “It is our responsibility in government to protect our people, wherever they may be, and ensure that they feel secure. With millions of Filipinos abroad, we will strive to protect them from harm arising from a nuclear incident, the only way to do this is to curtail the spread of and totally eliminate nuclear weapons,” Romulo said in remarks opening the workshop (Xinhua News Agency/People’s Daily Online, Feb. 1).

NPT Review Conference Workshop Held in Philippines, Global Security Newswire, Feb. 3, 2010

Cyberattacking

February 4th, 2010

image from Mark Thompson

The China-U.S. diplomatic spat over cyberattacks on Google has highlighted the growing significance of the Internet as a theater of combat. Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn recently warned of its appeal to foes who are unable to match the U.S.’s conventional military might. An enemy country could deploy hackers to take down U.S. financial systems, communications and infrastructure, he suggested, at a cost far below that of building a trillion-dollar fleet of fifth-generation jet fighters. “Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive cyber capabilities,” Lynn said. “Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure.”

What he didn’t say – and what U.S. officials don’t like to acknowledge – is that the Pentagon is hard at work developing an offensive cyber capability of its own. In fact, it has even begun using that capability to wage war. Beyond merely shutting down enemy systems, the U.S. military is crafting a witch’s brew of stealth, manipulation and falsehoods designed to lure the enemy into believing he is in charge of his forces when in fact they have been secretly enlisted as allies of the U.S. military. And some in Washington fear that there hasn’t been sufficient debate over the proper role of U.S. cyberweapons that are now being secretly developed. (See an invasion of Chinese cyberspies.)

Pentagon officials acknowledge privately that such work is under way, though nearly all of it is classified. The recent creation of U.S. Cyber Command shows that the U.S. military is taking this mission seriously. “You have to be very careful about what you say in this area,” says a top cyberwarrior of the Pentagon. “But you can tell there’s something going on because the services are putting their money there and contractors are going after it in a big way.” (See how cyberwar was envisioned in 1995.)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff want the ability to destroy an enemy’s computer network “so badly that it cannot perform any function,” according to the handbook on what the Pentagon calls “Information Operations.” The U.S. military wants to keep foes “from accessing and using critical information, systems and services” and to spoof adversaries “by manipulating their perception of reality.” Just how such wizardry is to be accomplished is contained in a classified supplement. But hints can be gleaned in a trickle of contracts and budget documents, larded with geek-speak, that have begun seeping onto the public record.

The Air Force wants the ability to burrow into any computer system anywhere in the world “completely undetected.” It wants to slip computer code into a potential foe’s computer and let it sit there for years, “maintaining a ‘low and slow’ gathering paradigm” to thwart detection. Clandestinely exploring such networks, the Dominant Cyber Offensive Engagement program’s goal is to “stealthily exfiltrate information” in hopes it might “discover information with previously unknown existence.” The U.S. cyberwarriors’ goal: “complete functional capabilities” of an enemy’s computer network – from U.S. military keyboards. The Army is developing “techniques that capture and identify data traversing enemy networks for the purpose of Information Operations or otherwise countering adversary communications.” And the Navy is developing “a non-lethal, non-attributable system designed to offer non-kinetic offensive information operation solutions,” according to Pentagon budget documents.

Yet concepts that have regulated war forever, such as deterrence and attribution, are slippery or missing in cyberspace. National boundaries don’t exist, making moot the question of sovereignty. Asymmetries abound: defenders must defend everything, all the time, while an attacker can prevail by exploiting a single vulnerability. Tracking down the source of cybersabotage, routed like a skipping stone through a series of innocent servers, can be all but impossible. Are the attackers curious teenagers, criminal gangs, a foreign power – or, more likely, a criminal gang sponsored by a foreign power? Deterrence becomes meaningless when the identity of an attacker is unknown.

“We’re in the stage before warfare,” cyberwarfare expert James Lewis told a Washington audience on Jan. 27. “We’re in the stages of people poking around.” Lewis, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said cyberdefenses are inadequate. “Unless we find a way to use offensive capabilities as part of a deterrence or strategic defense,” he said, “we will be unable to defeat these opponents.” CSIS also released last week a survey of cybersecurity experts from around the world who “rank the U.S. as the country ‘of greatest concern’ in the context of foreign cyberattacks, just ahead of China.”

It’s the instantaneous nature of cyberattacks that has rendered defenses against them obsolete. Once an enemy finds a chink in U.S. cyberarmor and opts to exploit it, it will be too late for the U.S. to play defense (it takes 300 milliseconds for a keystroke to travel halfway around the world). Far better to be on the prowl for cybertrouble and – with a few keystrokes or by activating secret codes long ago secreted in a prospective foe’s computer system – thwart any attack. Cyberdefense “never works” by itself, says the senior Pentagon officer. “There has to be an element of offense to have a credible defense.”

Such cyberbattles are already happening in miniature. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. cyberwarriors are hard at work denying enemy commanders the ability to direct their forces, the senior Pentagon officer says. “I shut it down, take away your electricity, take away the radio, infect your phone,” he explains. “Now you don’t know where I’m coming from, or if you do, you can’t tell the rest of your force what’s going on.” More insidiously, the U.S. can doctor the information the foe gets. “I can alter the messages coming across,” he says.

But there is mounting concern that U.S. offensive capability in cyberspace is growing too fast and too secretly. “I have no doubt we’re doing some very profoundly sophisticated things on the attack side,” says William Owens, a retired Navy admiral and cyberwar expert who led a federal study on U.S. offensive cyberwarfare last year. “But that is little realized by many people in Congress or the Administration.” That study, by the National Research Council, concluded that “the U.S. armed forces are actively preparing to engage in cyberattacks, and may have done so in the past.” But it added that a lack of public debate has led to “ill-formed, undeveloped and highly uncertain” policies regarding its use, which could lead the U.S. to stumble inadvertently into a cyberwar.

Mark Thompson, S. Pentagon Cyberwar Strategy: Secret Cyberweapons, TIME, Feb 2, 2010

Globalization: ills, corrections, and repetitions

February 3rd, 2010

BAt

The 1990s was “the age of abundance”, argued Brink Lindsey in a book of that title. Round the world, incomes were rising; capital markets were processing endless flows of money and investment; technological gains meant that ever more information was available ever more cheaply. And politics in the age of abundance, Mr Lindsey claimed, was all about values. In America this was the period of the “culture wars” over abortion and gun ownership; internationally, there was a huge expansion in concern over human rights.

The 2010s, it is sometimes said, will be an age of scarcity. The warning signs of change are said to be the food-price spike of 2007-08, the bid by China and others to grab access to oil, iron ore and farmland and the global recession. The main problems of scarcity are water and food shortages, demographic change and state failure. How will that change politics?

In the domestic debates of some rich democracies, things are shifting already. In Europe the talk is of how to distribute the pain of cutting public debts. In America the return of mad-as-hell populism looks like a turn away from the politics of abundance (see article). Now, a report for the Brookings Institution, a think-tank in Washington, DC, and the Centre on International Co-operation at New York University* looks at international politics in an age of want.

The sort of problems governments increasingly face, they say, will be much less predictable than those associated with old great-power rivalries. Pressure from demography, climate change and shifts in economic power builds up quietly for a long time—and then triggers abrupt shifts.

They claim that the current global system is ill-designed for such a world. It is not just that the foreign policies of big countries are in flux. Rather, the way states deal with new threats is, in the jargon, “stove-piped”. As a UN panel said in 2004, “finance ministers tend to work only with the international financial institutions, development ministers only with development programmes.”

The authors say that what is needed is not merely institutional tinkering but a different frame of mind. Governments, they say, should think more in terms of reducing risk and increasing resilience to shocks than about boosting sovereign power. This is because they think power may not be the best way for states to defend themselves against a new kind of threat: the sort that comes not from other states but networks of states and non-state actors, or from the unintended consequences of global flows of finance, technology and so on.

What would all that mean in practice? They cite the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation as the sort of institutions they want more of: bodies that use technical expertise—leaving aside the IPCC’s mistake over the melting of Himalayan glaciers—to induce countries to recognise their mutual interests. Such agencies can promote foresight, and help governments think harder about the consequences of failure (unlike traditional diplomacy, which likes muddling along). They propose an Intergovernmental Panel on Biological Safety along the lines of the IPCC to improve biosecurity; they also suggest boosting the G20 by giving it a secretariat and getting national security chiefs together.

Many of these ideas may go nowhere; national sovereignty is hugely resilient. But to those who call the whole exercise pointless, they cite Milton Friedman, who, when monetarism was being mocked in the 1970s, replied “our basic function [is] to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.”

Scarcity and globalisation: A needier era, Economist, Jan. 30, 2010, at 71

When Warfare is to be more Pleasant

February 2nd, 2010

 CBU image from DOD

The Perseus, a 900kg (2,000lb) bomb made in Greece, incinerates almost everything in an area larger than a dozen football fields. Farther out, oxygen is sucked from the air and people may be crushed by a pressure wave. The inferno is similar to that caused by napalm—a jellied-petrol explosive heavily restricted by a United Nations weapons convention.

Modified with new technologies, however, the Perseus is increasingly considered legitimate. Mark Hiznay, a bombs-control expert at Human Rights Watch, a humanitarian group based in New York, has gone so far as to say it has become a necessary weapon. With a stronger steel casing and backup shock-resistant triggering mechanisms, the Perseus can smash through several metres of reinforced concrete and detonate only after it has gone into a bunker. This makes the bomb a good way to destroy and sterilise germ- and chemical-warfare laboratories while limiting damage nearby, says Mr Hiznay.

A new generation of advanced ordnance, including the Perseus, is making bombing campaigns safer for civilians. During the first Gulf war, in 1991, American warplanes had to drop an average of six 450kg satellite-guided bombs to destroy a tank or a small building. During the second war, 12 years later, a similar attack required bombs half that size, and fewer of them. Today 100kg bombs would suffice, because guidance systems are so good that individual rooms, as opposed to entire buildings, can be aimed at.

Much of this revolution, as Mr Hiznay terms it, is due to guidance kits that can be attached to existing “dumb” bombs. An upgraded bomb, when falling, uses data from the global-positioning system in combination with laser and infra-red sensors to adjust a set of fins that work like aeroplane flaps. This steers the bomb towards its target—even if that target is moving. The AASM, a French navy and air-force guidance system, has fins that can guide and glide bombs for 50km (31 miles) and hit a target within a metre of the bullseye. The LJDAM, a system made by Boeing and first exported in 2008, can land a bomb on a vehicle that is travelling at 110kph.

The market for add-on guidance systems is booming. More than a dozen countries, including South Africa, make them. Two dozen—including India, Pakistan and Turkey—buy them. They are not cheap: $23,000 per bomb will get you one at the bottom of the range. It is not just a more effective weapon, but also a safer one for the bomber. He can fly higher, meaning that he is at less risk from ground fire.

Moreover, these bombs continue to be clever even after arriving at the target. Their fuses can set off explosions at precisely the right moment. One defence contractor, Israel Military Industries, makes a 225kg bomb, the MPR-500, that can hammer through several storeys of a building and explode on a chosen floor. This feat means triggering the detonation about two milliseconds after the bomb hits the ceiling above the doomed storey. The bomb can be programmed to do this just seconds before it is dropped. Such precision means it is sold as a replacement for ordnance two or more times its size.

Bomb-makers are also finding cleverer ways of destroying deeply buried bunkers. Almost five years ago, America’s Congress cut research funding for a controversial bunker-busting nuke called the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. Today the bulk of effort to develop bunker-smashers in Western countries employs conventional weaponry. In a classic attack, a succession of big bombs is dropped on the same spot. Such “drilling”, however, may require numerous warplanes and inflict great damage on the surrounding area.

Souping up bombs with rockets that speed up their impact might provide an alternative. Bunker-busters work best if they detonate after burrowing into the ground. This helps “couple” the explosion to the ground so that shock waves designed to collapse a bunker travel deeper. Israel Military Industries is studying a rocket that would ignite just before the bomb hit, digging it deeper than ever before exploding.

That, according to Meir Geva, head of aerial munitions at Israel Military Industries, can be very deep indeed. His firm makes a bunker-buster which weighs about as much as a small car. “To my great sorrow”, Mr Geva says, its shockwave ranges cannot be revealed.

Whatever the bunker-buster’s destructive power, the next generation of bombs will dwarf it. The Massive Ordnance Penetrator, an American bunker-buster scheduled for deployment at the end of the year, weighs 15 times as much.

On April 2nd 2003, during the second Gulf war, a hundred or so Iraqi armoured vehicles approached a far smaller American reconnaissance unit south of Baghdad. Responding to a call for help, a B-52 bomber attacked the first 30 or so vehicles in the column with a single, historic pass. It dropped two new CBU-105 bombs, and the result shocked the soldiers of both sides—and, soon enough, military observers everywhere.

While falling, the CBU-105 bombs popped open, each releasing ten submunitions which were slowed by parachutes. Each of these used mini rockets to spin and eject outward four discs the size of ice-hockey pucks.

The 80 free-falling discs from the pair of bombs then scanned the ground with lasers and heat-detecting infra-red sensors to locate armoured vehicles. Those discs that identified a target exploded dozens of metres up. The blast propelled a tangerine-sized slug of copper down into the target, destroying it with the impact and the accompanying shrapnel. The soldiers in the 70 vehicles farther back in the column surrendered immediately.

The CBU-105, however frightening, may actually point the way toward less violent warfare. Cluster munitions—which release bomblets to cover a wide area—are banned or tightly restricted by an international convention. But the CBU-105 and its cousins, known as sensor-fused weapons, are considered legal because very few discs remain unexploded on the battlefield. Those that fail to detect a target are supposed to self-destruct in the air. The trigger batteries of those that do not will quickly die, so duds are unlikely to kill civilians later.

Crucially, the manufacturer of the CBU-105, Textron Defense Systems, of Wilmington, Massachusetts, is improving sensors to allow the weapon to distinguish the heat signatures of cars, buses and homes from those of military hardware. If there is such a thing as a humanitarian bomb, this might be it.

By contrast, consider another sort of new weapon. The explosion of Russia’s “Father of All Bombs” approaches that of a small nuclear weapon; it would flatten many city blocks. In 2007, the government showed it off proudly on prime-time television. To most military men, such a bomb is not a PR coup, but an embarrassment.

Aerial bombardment, The calibration of destruction, Economist, Jan. 30, 2010, at 87

A Resting Place for Nuclear Waste: Spain

February 1st, 2010

Nuclear power station in Almonacid de Zorita (Spain).jpg. mage from wikipedia

A small Spanish town council on Thursday voted to house a long-delayed national nuclear waste dump, the only local authority to do so with the Jan. 31 deadline for bids looming, state radio said.  The ruling Popular Party in Yebra, 80 km (50 miles) east of Madrid, defeated the Socialist Party group by five votes to two after a heated debate.  “The motion is approved,” mayor Juan Pedro Sanchez said on broadcast by radio station RNE.

Sanchez said the town needed the waste dump to offset the loss of jobs due to the 2006 closure of a nuclear power station in nearby Zorita.  Environmental group Ecologistas en Accion has opposed the move, saying high level radioactive waste remains toxic for hundreds of thousands of years.  The head of government in Castilla-La Mancha, the region where Yebra lies, suggested on his local authority website that the dump be located in neighbouring Catalonia.  “Asco is an excellent site,” Jose Maria Barreda said, referring to a nuclear power station near the eastern port of Tarragona.

Spain’s central government called for bids last month to house high-level nuclear waste for up to 60 years. The country’s nuclear power stations no longer have room to store much more than the 6,700 tonnes of spent fuel rods they have accumulated.  The government has estimated the project will cost 540 million euros ($767 million), create 300 jobs and cover 20 hectares.  The United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, the IAEA, in 2008 recommended Spain step up efforts to find a purpose-built site for storing high-level nuclear waste.

Spain town bids to house nuclear waste dump,Reuters, Jan 21, 2010

Blowing it Off without Grace: IPCC and Climate Change

January 29th, 2010

himalaya glacier

The idea that the Himalaya could lose its glaciers by 2035—glaciers which feed rivers across South and East Asia—is a dramatic and apocalyptic one. After the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said such an outcome was very likely in the assessment of the state of climate science that it made in 2007, onlookers (including this newspaper) repeated the claim with alarm. In fact, there is no reason to believe it to be true. This is good news (within limits) for Indian farmers—and bad news for the IPCC.

The IPCC, like ancient Gaul, is divided into three parts. Working Group I looks at the physical science of climate change. Working Group II is concerned with impacts, vulnerability and adaptation. Working Group III deals with mitigation. The claims about Himalayan glaciers come from a short “case study” in a chapter on Asia in WG-II’s report from 2007. Like all of the IPCC’s work, this was meant to be an expert assessment of relevant research, resting mostly on peer-reviewed sources but also, at times, on the “grey literature”—reports by governments and other organisations that are not commercially or academically published.

The WG-II case study cites a grey report by the WWF, an environmental group, as the source of the date 2035. The WWF in turn cites a study presented in 1999 to the International Commission on Snow and Ice (ICSI) by Syed Hasnain, chair of ICSI’s working group on Himalayan glaciers.

But the passage about 2035 that the WWF report quotes comes not from that ICSI report (which was unpublished) but from an article that appeared around the same time in Down to Earth, an Indian magazine. This article was based in part on an interview with Dr Hasnain, who was also quoted by New Scientist as saying it was possible the glaciers would be gone in 40 years. The article in Down to Earth claims that the area covered by glaciers would drop from 500,000km2 to 100,000km2 by 2035, a claim found in the IPCC report but not in the WWF report. This suggests the Down to Earth article was itself a source for the IPCC, though Murari Lal, a retired Indian academic, now a consultant, who was one of the four co-ordinating lead authors of the chapter, says this was not the case.

There are two further problems with the area figure. One is that the research in question was looking at all the world’s glaciers, not just the Himalaya’s. The other is that the research was looking at the prospects for 2350, not 2035.

Georg Kaser, a glaciologist at the University of Innsbruck, explains that a timescale of centuries, not decades, is far more plausible for the Himalaya. Politics and logistics make a comprehensive study of Himalayan glaciers difficult, but if those individual glaciers which have been studied recently are representative, then the glaciers are retreating. This retreat, however, is likely to take a long time. To melt a glacier at an altitude above 6,000 metres, where many of the Himalayan glaciers are found, requires a lot more warming than can be expected by 2035—a point made forcefully in a letter to Science by Dr Kaser and others, published this week. Jeff Kargel of the University of Arizona, one of its authors, stresses that its criticism is aimed at this specific claim, not at the IPCC in general, and should not be seen as undermining the panel’s conclusions.

On January 20th the IPCC released a statement reiterating its overall conclusion on water from seasonal snow packs and glaciers in a warming world: that it is likely to be scarcer and available at different times. The statement also says that in the case study on the Himalaya’s glaciers “the clear and well-established standards of evidence, required by the IPCC procedures, were not applied properly.” Christopher Field of the Carnegie Institution’s Department of Global Ecology, who is now the co-chair of WG-II, says the fact that the review process failed to catch the problem needs to be looked into.

That a review process which included 40,000 comments did not catch the error proves that size is not everything—especially since the error was quite catchable. Dr Kaser read the chapter after it was reviewed but before it was published. As a glaciologist—he was an author of the relevant chapter in the WG-I report, a much more thorough take on the subject which makes no grandiose claims about the Himalaya—he found the passage absurd, and alerted the IPCC. Problems he had with a passage on glaciers in WG-II’s chapter on Africa were subsequently addressed. Those in the chapter on Asia were not.

This poses two questions. One is why Dr Kaser, or some other glaciologist, did not see the chapter earlier on. Like Gaul’s three parts, the IPCC’s working groups, rooted in different disciplines, have different tribal structures; they do not communicate as well as they should. Dr Field says he is determined to try to do something about this in the process leading up to the next set of assessments in 2013.

The other question is why, when alerted by Dr Kaser, the IPCC did nothing. When open criticism began last year, it was airily dismissed by Rajendra Pachauri, who chairs the IPCC and runs an institute in India where Dr Hasnain now works on glaciology. If he had not heard the claims were wrong by that stage, he should have done. This mixture of sloppiness, lack of communication and high-handedness gives the IPCC’s critics a lot to work with.

Meanwhile, the future of water resources in the places served by the glaciers remains unclear. Glaciers in monsoonal climates, unlike high-latitude glaciers, gain mass from precipitation during the same warm season in which they lose mass from melting, which makes their behaviour complex. And there are other water-related questions to be addressed, including possible changes to the monsoons and massive depletion of groundwater. There is an urgent need to study these things, and to synthesise the results in a way that can be relied on.

Glaciers and the IPCC: Off-base camp, Economist, Jan. 21, 2010

Repatriating High-Level Nuclear Waste and What to Do with It: Japan-UK

January 28th, 2010

sellafied nuclear plant UK.  Image from http://www.independent.co.uk/multimedia/archive/00038/Sellafield_38248t.jpg

The first consignment of solid highly active waste belonging to Sellafield’s Japanese customers has started its journey back to Japan from the UK. The waste arose from the reprocessing of those customers’ used nuclear fuel at Sellafield. The flask of waste is transferred onto the Pacific Sandpiper.   The first stage was the transport of a single 113te flask, containing 28 stainless steel containers of solid high-level waste (HLW) from the Sellafield site, on a specially constructed rail wagon, to the port of Barrow, ready for shipment to Japan.  The flask, weighing about 14 tonnes in total, was then transferred on to a Pacific Nuclear Transport Ltd (PNTL) vessel, the Pacific Sandpiper, prior to its departure for Japan. The voyage is due to be completed by the end of March. At the waste’s ultimate destination, Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd (JNFL) is preparing to receive the 28 canisters.  Overseas used nuclear fuel has been reprocessed in the UK, under contract, to recover and separate the 97% of reusable nuclear materials from the 3% waste. Since 1976, all UK reprocessing contracts have contained an option for this radioactive waste to be returned to its country of origin and in 1986 the UK government took the decision that this option should be exercised.   Originally it had been planned to return both high- and low-level reprocessing wastes to Japan, but UK government policy on waste substitution now means that the UK can instead return a greater amount of high-level waste to the customer but retain a radiologically equivalent amount of low- and intermediate-level waste in the UK for long term management. As a result, instead of transporting 850 packages of high-level wastes and 12,000 cubic metres of low-level wastes to Japan, only about 150 cubic metres of high-level wastes will need to be transported, substantially reducing the number of trips needed.

The HLW is being returned in a solid glass (vitrified) form under what is known in the UK as the Vitrified Residue Return (VRR) program. The program will see waste from UK reprocessing services returned to overseas customers in Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Italy over a 10-year period, with at least one return shipment per year. Overall, the UK phase of the program will return some 1850 containers of vitrified waste. The return program will mean that the volume of solid HLW stored temporarily in the UK is substantially reduced.

 Ian Hudson the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority’s Sellafield programme director said: “The commencement of this first return of high level waste to overseas customers is a significant milestone in meeting our contractual commitments and delivering on government policy.” m The repatriation of high-level wastes from Japanese fuel reprocessed in France was completed in 2007, with PNTL completing a program of 12 similar shipments. Without a waste substitution policy, low-level wastes from French reprocessing will also be returned to Japan, with transports expected to begin in 2013.  Mark Jervis, Managing Director of International Nuclear Services (INS), parent company of PNTL, said: “The waste is being transported by sea which is a tried and tested method that is safe, highly regulated and internationally approved.”

High-level waste sets sail for Japan, World Nuclear News, Jan. 21, 2008

Between a rock and a gravel: the Exxon Valdez legacy

January 27th, 2010

image from http://img.timeinc.net/time/daily/2009/0903/exxon_valdez_0323.jpg

Large quantities of oil spilled during the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster can still be found beneath gravel beaches in Alaska, a study has discovered.  Writing in Nature Geoscience, a team of scientists found that oil just a few inches down was dissipating up to 1,000 times slower than oil on the surface.  They suggested that a lack of oxygen and nutrients in the gravel was slowing the dispersal of the remaining oil.  The results could have implications for cleaning up future spills, they added.

Considered to be one of the worst environmental disasters of its kind, the Exxon Valdez tanker spilled 38,000 tonnes of crude oil into Alaska’s Prince William Sound after the vessel hit a reef.  As a result, more than 2,000km (1,250 miles) of coastline was affected, killing thousands of seabirds and having a serious impact on the region’s fishing industry.  In the five years after the disaster, the oil was shown to be dispersing at a rate of about 70% each year.  Most clean-up operations in the area ended in 1992 because the remaining oil was expected to disperse within a few years.

A later study discovered that the oil was disappearing at a rate of just 4% each year, and that an estimated 20,000 gallons remained in the beaches.  Researchers led by Professor Michel Boufadel from Temple University in Philadelphia, US, carried out a three-year study on a number of beaches to find out the cause behind the lingering deposits.  Prof Boufadel, director of the university’s Center for Natural Resources Development and Protection, said the gravel beaches they examined were made up of two layers: a top level that was highly permeable, and a lower level that had very low permeability.  While the two layers were made from the same material, he said the lower level had become compacted as a result of tidal movements, limiting the volume of seawater that was able to penetrate the gravel.  In their paper, the team observed that the upper layer temporarily stored the oil, while it slowly and continuously filled the lower layer.  “”You have a high amount of oxygen in the seawater, so you would think that the oxygen would diffuse in the beach and get down 2-4 inches (5-10cm) into the lower layer and get to the oil,” said Prof Boufadel.  “But the outward movement of [fresh groundwater] in the lower level is blocking the oxygen from spreading down into that lower level.”

He explained that oxygen and nutrients were needed to sustain micro-organisms that “ate” the oil.  However, without the necessary supply of the key ingredients reaching the lower level, the biodegradation of the oil was occurring at a much slower rate.  “We suggest that similar dynamics could operate on tidal gravel beaches around the world, which are particularly common in mid- and high-latitude regions,” the team wrote in their paper.  “Thus, our findings are of direct application for the susceptibility of beaches worldwide to long-term oil contamination and provide guidelines for remediating oil-polluted beaches.”

They added that climate change was reducing ice cover, “exposing the Arctic to oil exploitation and shipping” and increasing the risk of oil spills in the future.  Professor Boufadel and his team are now exploring ways to deliver the necessary levels of oxygen and nutrients to affected areas to accelerate the dissipation of the remaining oil.

Mark Kinver, Gravel ‘traps Exxon Valdez oil’, BBC News, Jan. 18, 2010